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abstract: Conflicts of interest over resources or reproduction
among individuals in a social group have long been considered to
result in automatic and universal costs to group living. However,
exploring how social conflict varies with group size has produced
mixed empirical results. Here we develop a model that generates
alternative predictions for how social conflict should vary with group
size depending on the type of benefits gained from being in a social
group. We show that a positive relationship between social conflict
and group size is favored when groups form primarily for the benefits
of sociality but not when groups form mainly for accessing group-
defended resources. Thus, increased social conflict in animal societies
should not be viewed as an automatic cost of larger social groups.
Instead, studying the relationship between social conflict and the
types of grouping benefits will be crucial for understanding the evo-
lution of complex societies.
Keywords: group size, social conflict, cooperative breeding, eusocial-
ity, sociality.
Introduction
Animals living in social groups receive a number of direct
and indirect benefits, but they must also pay a variety of
costs (Alexander 1974). One of the primary costs associ-
ated with living in groups of genetically distinct organisms
is the cost associated with conflicts of interest over re-
sources or the distribution of reproduction among indi-
viduals in a social group. We define conflicts of interest
as situations in which there is a possibility of some in-
dividuals increasing their fitness at the expense of other
individuals (Ratnieks and Reeve 1992; Godfray 1995).
Conflicts of interest can be a repulsive force for the evo-
lution of group living because they frequently generate
selection for costly harming behaviors aimed at securing
a larger share of reproduction or group resources (Reeve
2000; Queller and Strassmann 2009). We define the re-
alization of such costly behaviors as social conflict. Social
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conflict may occur at all levels of biological organization
and reduce (or even negate) the benefits of sociality. There-
fore, determining the factors that influence levels of con-
flict within groups is central for not only studying the
evolution of complex societies (Krause and Ruxton 2002;
Bourke 2011) but also for understanding other major evo-
lutionary transitions, such as the transition from single
cellularity to multicellularity (Maynard-Smith and Szath-
mary 1997; Calcott and Sterelny 2011).
Social conflict has been considered an automatic and
universal cost of group living because the level of social
conflict is often assumed to increase with the number of
competing individuals in a group (Alexander 1974). How-
ever, empirical studies of animal societies have generally
failed to produce consistent relationships between group
size and social conflict (Monnin et al. 2003; Clutton-Brock
et al. 2008; Mileva et al. 2009; Amsalem and Hefetz 2011).
This failure to identify consistent patterns may occur be-
cause other social factors (e.g., the fitness benefits to
grouping) and ecological factors (e.g., the level of available
group resources) may also vary with group size and in-
fluence levels of social conflict. As a result, the relationship
between group productivity and group size could vary
among species because groups form for varying types of
benefits in different organisms. For example, some animals
form social groups to access fixed resources. In these cases
(e.g., carcass sharing in burying beetles; Eggert and Muller
1997; Robertson et al. 1998), per capita productivity will
decrease with increasing group size, whereas total group
productivity remains constant. In contrast, many social
animals form groups because living in a group by itself
has some benefit, such as predator avoidance or detection
(Alexander 1974). In these cases (e.g., cooperative breeding
in lions; VanderWaal et al. 2009), group productivity may
increase with increasing group size until reaching the most
productive size, at which point it may decrease. Thus, to
fully understand the nature of social conflict within com-
plex societies, one must also consider the type of benefits
obtained from group living and how these benefits vary
with group size.
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Figure 1: Summary of the theoretical framework of our model
Few theoretical models have explicitly addressed the re-
lationship between social conflict and group size. Most
theoretical works modeling how social and ecological fac-
tors influence social conflict either are simple two-player
models (Johnstone 2000; Shen and Reeve 2010; Cant 2012)
or do not consider the effect of group size (Frank 1995;
Foster 2004; but see Reeve and Ho¨lldobler 2007, which
modeled within-group conflict in the context of between-
group competition). Thus, the general relationships among
group size, group productivity, and social conflict remain
largely unexplored theoretically, and given the mixed em-
pirical evidence of a consistent relationship between group
size and social conflict, better predictive models are clearly
needed. Here we construct an evolutionary game-theoretic
model to investigate the relationship between social con-
flict and group size under different ecological and social
conditions. Using our model, we derive key predictions
that can be tested in group-living vertebrates and inver-
tebrates to better understand how social and ecological
factors impact animal social evolution.
The Model
The Model Framework (see fig. 1)
We begin by explicitly defining social conflict as any act
that increases the initiator’s share of the group resources
at the expense of other interacting individuals (Reeve
2000). Our definition includes contest competition (e.g.,
overt aggression, dominance testing; Miller 1967; Isbell
1991) as well as scramble competition (e.g., foraging effort
in group-living animals; Van Schaik and Van Noordwijk
1988; Shaw et al. 1995) and even reproductive conflict
over offspring production in plural breeding species (Ru-
benstein 2012; Shen et al. 2012). Importantly, we define
an individual’s contribution to social conflict in our model
as competitive effort, z. To understand how social conflict
is influenced by group size, we examine how an indi-
vidual’s competitive effort varies with group size and group
productivity (i.e., the total reproductive output influenced
by the group resources; see also Frank 1995, 2003). We
assume that group productivity, , is ag(z , z , … , z , n)1 2 n
function of group size and that each group member’s share
of the group productivity will increase as their level of
competitive effort, z, increases. We further assume that
competitive effort will not only have a negative impact on
the group productivity itself but also on an individual’s
future fitness because there is a personal cost to exerting
competitive effort (Rubenstein and Shen 2009).
Building on the framework of Frank (1995; see also
Reeve et al. 1998), we investigate the tension between
group productivity and individual competition for a share
of that group productivity as group size varies. The fitness
function of a focal individual i in a group of size isn, wi
w (z , z , … , z , n) p g(z , z , … , z , n)i 1 2 n 1 2 n
zi#  c(z ), (1)in zjjp1
where c(zi) is the personal cost of the competitive effort
zi and is the group productivity function.g(z , z , … , z , n)1 2 n
Importantly, our formulation differs from those of Frank
(1995, 1998) and subsequent authors (Foster 2004) in that
we include the personal cost of social conflict (Rubenstein
and Shen 2009). We assume that the cost function satisfies
two sets of conditions: (i) and ,2 2g/z ! 0  g/z ≤ 0i i
which represent group productivity as a decreasing and
linear or accelerating function of a focal individual’s com-
petitive effort; and (ii) and , which2 2c/z 1 0  c/z 1 0i i
imply that the proportional personal cost is an increasing
and accelerating function of a focal individual’s compet-
itive effort (Trivers 1972).
We consider a population where individuals are genet-
ically related to each other, which we characterize by the
(demographically scaled) relatedness coefficient r (Leh-
mann and Rousset 2010; Akc¸ay and Van Cleve 2012). In
general, this scaled relatedness coefficient will be a function
of variables such as migration rate and group size. For
example, in the island model with overlapping generations,
relatedness scales as 2(1  m)s/{n[2  m(1  s)]  2(1 
, where m and s are the migration rates betweenm)s}
groups and survivorship, respectively (Taylor and Irwin
2000; Akc¸ay and Van Cleve 2012). In different biological
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scenarios, relatedness will vary with group size in different
ways, though in general, it is expected to decrease with
increasing group size. We further assume that individuals’
competitive efforts are “sealed bid” efforts or that they do
not respond to each other’s behavior (Akc¸ay and Van Cleve
2012). Given these assumptions, the evolutionarily stable
level of competitive effort in a monomorphic population
must satisfy
w wi i * (n  1)r p 0 for j ( i and z p z p z . (2)i j
z zi j
For simplicity, we present the analysis for nonkin groups
(i.e., ) here, but we also present the full analysis ofr p 0
the model in the appendix. Combining equations (1) and
(2), after some rearrangement, we obtain
(g/n) (g/n)(n  1) c
  p 0. (3)
*z nz zi i
To understand how the evolutionarily stable level of
competitive effort, , changes with group size, we consider*z
how each of the three terms changes with n. The first term
in equation (3), the change in per capita group produc-
tivity with the competitive effort zi , is negative since com-
petition decreases group production. This term represents
the share of the marginal cost of competition to the group
that accrues to a single (in this case, the focal) individual.
The second term is always positive and can be interpreted
as the marginal benefit to the focal individual to invest in
competition; the numerator is the total of the group pro-
ductivity accruing to everyone but the focal individual,
while the denominator reflects the fact that the “pie” is
divided according to relative competitive effort. Finally,
the third term reflects a private cost that is negative and
independent of n. In other words, equation (3) says that
competitive effort will increase with n if the marginal cost
of competition to the per capita group productivity (i.e.,
the first term) increases more slowly than the marginal
incentive to invest in competition. Both terms are ulti-
mately determined by how the per capita group produc-
tivity changes with group size. Thus, per capita produc-
tivity is the crucial quantity in determining the variation
in social conflict as a function of group size.
Finally, in the appendix, we analyze this general model
systematically and find that the evolutionarily stable level
of competitive effort ( ) will increase with group size if*z
the increase in per capita productivity is above a threshold
but otherwise decrease. In other words, (i) social conflict
can either increase or decrease with group size, and (ii)
per capita group productivity is an important determinant
of this social conflict–group size relationship. Below, we
illustrate these general results with specific group produc-
tivity–group size functions.
Examples with Specific Productivity Functions
To explore how different ecological and social conditions
impact social conflict, we focus on three specific produc-
tivity–group size functions that illustrate the range of var-
iation observed in nature (fig. 2A, 2B; Krause and Ruxton
2002). Importantly, these cases illustrate three of the pri-
mary reasons why animal social groups form, but they will
differ in how potential total group productivity (i.e., the
total reproductive output if all group resources are used
for reproduction without engaging in social conflict) and
potential per capita productivity vary with group size.
When groups form (i) to gain access to critical fixed group
resources, potential group productivity is unaffected by
group size, but potential per capita productivity decreases
as group size increases. However, when groups form (ii)
to receive social benefits through group living, both po-
tential group productivity and per capita productivity will
initially increase as group size increases. However, both
measures of productivity may decrease as group size in-
creases further due to the detrimental effect of grouping.
Finally, when groups form (iii) to enhance resource ac-
quisition (e.g., territorial defense), potential group pro-
ductivity will still increase as group size increases, but po-
tential per capita productivity will decrease with increasing
group size (Alexander 1974; Emlen 1982; Koenig et al.
1992; Queller and Strassmann 1998).
Access to Critical Fixed Group Resources. Using equation
(1), the fitness function of a focal individual in groups
that form to gain access to critical fixed resources (rep-
resented in fig. 2 by G1) becomes
zi 2w p [g  z  (n  1)z ]  az . (4)i 0 i j iz  (n  1)zi j
Equation (4) makes explicit an important distinction be-
tween “potential” and “observed” group productivity. Po-
tential group productivity, given by g0 in equation (4), and
its relation to the group size is important in determining
social conflict (see also Frank 1995, 2003). In contrast,
observed group productivity (i.e., in[g  z  (n  1)z ]0 i j
eq. [4]) is the actual outcome of expending part of the
group resources in social conflict. Importantly, observed
group productivity can be directly measured in nature,
whereas the measure of potential group productivity must
account for the loss of group production to social conflict
(e.g., must measure the total number of offspring pro-
duced prior to infanticide occurring; Ratnieks et al. 2006;
Rankin et al. 2007; Bourke 2011).
In equation (4), potential group productivity (i.e., g0)
is unaffected by group size (fig. 2A), but potential per
capita productivity (i.e., ) decreases as group size in-g /n0
creases (fig. 2B). Examples of this type of group produc-
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Figure 2: Examples of the relationships between group size and potential group productivity (i.e., group productivity in the absence of
competition; A) and potential per capita productivity (B). Parameters g and b are scaling factors for describing different shapes of the group
productivity and group size functions, and n represents group size. The term represents the group size with maximum potential groupnˆ
productivity, and indicates the group size of maximum potential per capita productivity. G1, G2, and G3 indicate different potential group
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tivity function include the burying beetle example men-
tioned earlier as well as artificial groups, such as captive
farm animals where individuals often compete for limited
resources (e.g., food, water, attractive laying areas; An-
dersen et al. 2004).
Using the first order condition for evolutionary stability
(eq. [2]), we find the evolutionarily stable level of com-
petitive effort when group production is given by equation
(4) to be
2 2 2n [n  8ag (n  1)(r  1)]  n0
*z p . (5)i 24an
This equation predicts that decreases with n (fig. 3A,*zi
dashed line; see also “Results and Discussion”). Addition-
ally, this level of conflict will be convergence stable (i.e.,
fixation of successive mutations will move the population
closer to the evolutionarily stable level of competitive ef-
fort; Eshel and Motro 1981; Christiansen 1991) when the
following condition holds: *(d/dz )[(w /z )  r(n i i
. Furthermore, it can be*1)(w /z )] ! 0 and z p z p zi j i j
verified that within the relevant range of relatedness (i.e.,
), a necessary and sufficient condition for conver-r ! 1
gence stability is .r ! 1/(n  1)
Social Benefits of Group Living. In groups that form be-
cause of the benefits of sociality per se, such as cooper-
atively breeding lions, cooperatively hunting groups, or
even flocks of birds (represented in fig. 2 by G2), we expect
both potential group productivity and per capita produc-
tivity to increase initially as group size increases (fig. 2).
However, both measures of productivity may decrease as
group size increases further due to the detrimental effect
of grouping (e.g., inefficiency of utilizing group-enhancing
resources or other factors that negatively influence fitness
such as parasite loads). Similarly, applying equation (1),
the fitness function of a focal individual in groups that
form for social benefit is
2 3w p [g n  bn  z  (n  1)z ]i 0 i j
z i 2#  az . (6)iz  (n  1)zi j
The evolutionarily stable level of competitive effort in this
case is
1  8a(n  1)(g  bn)(1  r)  10
*z p . (7)i 4a
This result shows that can either increase or decrease*zi
with n (fig. 3A, solid line; see also “Results and Discus-
sion”). This level of conflict will also be convergence stable
within the relevant range of parameter space (i.e., g 10
, , and ).bn n 1 1 r 1 0
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Figure 3: Results of variation group size (n) with individual competitive effort ( ; A); percentage of potential group productivity expended*z
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Resource Acquisition. When groups form to improve re-
source acquisition (represented in fig. 2 by G3), potential
group productivity could still increase as group size increases
(fig. 2A), but potential per capita productivity will decrease
with increasing group size (fig. 2B). This occurs because the
enhancement of resource acquisition through grouping is
not large enough to benefit every group member. This pat-
tern occurs in many cooperatively breeding birds, where
social groups often form because suitable breeding terri-
tories are not available and having helpers will lead to in-
creased group productivity but reduced per capita produc-
tivity (Stacey and Koenig 1990; Koenig and Dickinson
2004). The fitness function of a focal individual in groups
that form for resource acquisition is described as
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2w p [g n  bn  z  (n  1)z ]i 0 i j
z i 2#  az . (8)iz  (n  1)zi j
The evolutionarily stable level of competitive effort is
n[n  8a(n  1)(g  bn)(1  r)]  n0
*z p . (9)i 4an
As in equation (7), this result shows that can either in-*zi
crease or decrease with n (fig. 3A, dotted-dashed line). As
before, this level of conflict will be convergence stable within
the relevant range of parameter space (i.e., , ,g 1 bn n 1 10
and ).r 1 0
Results and Discussion
Our model has three primary results. First, social conflict
(i.e., costly competitive efforts of individuals, ) can either*z
increase or decrease as group size increases. Second, the
relationship between group productivity and group size
plays a critical role in determining the direction of this
relationship (fig. 3A). Third, the proportion of (potential)
group productivity expended on social conflict (i.e.,
) typically increases with increasing group size (fig.*nz /Gx
3B). In general, an individual’s competitive effort will typ-
ically increase as potential per capita productivity increases
with group size, but it will decrease as per capita produc-
tivity decreases with group size (fig. 3A; but see also in-
equality [A4] in the appendix for the general relationship).
The intuition behind this result is simply that the marginal
benefit of competitive behavior increases with the per cap-
ita productivity of the group as group size increases, re-
sulting in higher incentives to engage in conflict. This
relatively simple prediction of our model and the intuition
behind it have important consequences for understanding
social conflict in animal societies.
We explored this result further by considering three
specific models for how animals benefit from living in
groups that form for different reasons. For groups that
form primarily to access critical resources, such as burying
beetles, many cooperatively breeding birds and animals
living in artificial groups (described by G1, if individuals
do not produce or defend the resource socially, or by G3,
if resources are a more important determinant of pro-
ductivity than sociality itself), per capita productivity is
likely to decrease as group size increases (Koenig and Dick-
inson 2004). We demonstrate that in these cases, it is more
likely that the evolutionarily stable level of competitive
effort will decrease with increasing group size. In support
of this prediction, social aggression has been shown to
decrease with increasing group size in many groups of farm
animals (reviewed in Andersen et al. 2004). Alternatively,
if groups form primarily because of the fitness benefits
associated with living socially with others per se, then we
expect a hump-shaped fitness-group size relationship, as
has been observed in many cooperatively breeding mam-
mals (Solomon and French 1997) and eusocial insects
(Choe and Crespi 1997). Consequently, social conflict is
predicted to increase with increasing group size until group
size is larger than the most productive size in these species.
This relationship occurs in stenogastrine wasps, where so-
cial aggression was positively correlated with the total
number and per capita number of brood (Fanelli et al.
2008), as well as in bumblebees Bombus terrestris, where
the frequency of aggressions in both a- and b-workers
increased with increasing group size (Amsalem and Hefetz
2011).
Our results also show that observed per capita produc-
tivity, individual fitness, and potential per capita produc-
tivity still have similar relationships with group size, due
to the adjustment of an individual’s competitive effort (fig.
3C, 3D). As we pointed out earlier, although potential
group productivity is an important parameter in deter-
mining levels of social conflict, most empirical studies
measure the observed as opposed to potential group pro-
ductivity. Because our model shows that potential group
productivity and observed group productivity have a qual-
itatively similar relationship with group size, it provides a
theoretical basis for understanding the relationship be-
tween group size and social conflict when only observed
group productivity is available. Finally, it is important to
point out that social conflict was predicted to increase with
decreasing group productivity in a previous, non-game-
theoretical model (Reeve and Nonacs 1997). However, this
model did not consider variation in group productivity
with group size, as we have done here. Although additional
empirical studies are clearly needed to test the different
predicted relationships among group productivity, group
size, and social conflict in social animals, our model’s pre-
dictions are consistent with empirical data from a diverse
array of taxa.
Our model also predicts that a larger proportion of
potential group productivity will be expended in social
conflict (i.e., ) as group size increases (fig. 3B), de-*nz /Gx
spite the fact that per capita competitive effort ( ) might*z
decrease (fig. 3A), simply because there are more individ-
uals competing and therefore consuming the group re-
sources. Both competitive effort ( ) and standardized*z
competitive effort ( ) can be viewed as measures of*nz /Gx
social conflict. We suggest that the absolute effort (e.g.,
the frequency of aggressions) would be a better measure
for understanding the fitness consequences of social con-
flict in intraspecific studies where actual numbers of off-
spring (or resources) lost can be compared across groups.
In contrast, the standardized competitive effort (e.g., the
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percentage of eggs destroyed) is more suitable for com-
parative studies examining conflict resolution (i.e., the re-
duction of group resources expended on actual conflict)
among different species (e.g., Ratnieks et al. 2006; fig. 3)
because it provides a standard measure of social conflict
for animals with different life histories. We envision that
systems where potential group productivity is easier to
measure, such as cooperatively breeding vertebrates that
exhibit infanticide or egg tossing (Mumme et al. 1983;
Young and Clutton-Brock 2006) or social insects that ex-
hibit egg eating (Wenseleers and Ratnieks 2006), will be
especially suitable for testing the predictions of our model
and for understanding the nature of social conflict and
conflict resolution.
Finally, we find that, not surprisingly, genetic relatedness
can moderate the level of social conflict in a group, but
even genetically related individuals will be in conflict (fig.
4A–4C). Additionally, smaller proportions of potential
group productivity will be expended on social conflict
among more closely related group members (fig. 4D–4F).
However, relatedness does not qualitatively change the pre-
dictions of the model about how group productivity and
group size influence social conflict (see appendix for the
general analysis). The predictions of the model, such as
how group productivity and group size influence social
conflict, are qualitatively similar in groups with different
average relatedness among group members (fig. 4).
In summary, determining how social conflict varies with
group size is vital for understanding animal social evo-
lution. Here we highlight the importance of identifying
different group size–group productivity relationships in
examining how social conflict varies with group size. Our
model shows that social conflict should not be automat-
ically assumed to increase with group size. Instead, natural
selection adjusts competitive efforts in response to both
group productivity and group size. To illustrate the range
of expected outcomes, we present alternative scenarios for
how conflict might vary with group size for groups that
form for different reasons. For example, in most coop-
eratively breeding birds and farm animals living in artificial
groups, where groups typically have limited critical re-
sources, social conflict is predicted to decrease as group
size increases. In contrast, in most social insects and co-
operatively breeding mammals where groups form due to
the benefits of associating with greater numbers of indi-
viduals, a positive relationship between group size and
social conflict is predicted. Our model thus provides a
simple but general ecological explanation for various forms
of social conflict and group size relationships in a diverse
array of complex animal societies. Moreover, it can be
applied to a range of social phenomenon, including social
stress, sibling competition, and within-group conflict in
cooperative breeders and social foragers.
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APPENDIX
Analysis of the General Model
The fitness function of a focal individual, wi, in a group of size n, as described in the main article, is
ziw (z , z , … , z , n) p g(z , z , … , z , n)  c(z ). (A1)i 1 2 n 1 2 n in Zjjp1
The evolutionarily stable level of competitive effort must then satisfy equation (2) in the main text. Since equation
(2) holds for all values of n and z, we can differentiate with respect to n to obtain, after some rearrangement,
* * ′ * ′z z[A  nz (n{[1  (n  1)r]g  nrc }  (1  r)g  n(n  1)(g  ng z )r )]z ,n z zi i ip , (A2)
* * ′′n n[1  (n  1)r](nz {(n  1)g  z [g  (n  1)g  nc ]}  g(n  1))z z , z z , zi i i i j
where and the subscripts on g denote the partial derivatives withA p g{[n(n  1)  2]r  (n  2)}  g n(n  1)(1  r)n
respect to the variables in the subscripts. Additionally, we have taken advantage of the assumption that the group
productivity is symmetric in all . Note that we allow the scaled relatedness r to be a function of the group size.zi
Given the assumptions described in the main text, all the terms in the denominator of , except for the one*z /n
involving , are negative. For now, assume that is small enough that the whole denominator is negative. Ing gz , z z , zi j i j
this case, the sign of , which represents whether social conflict will increase or decrease with group size, will be*z /n
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determined by its numerator. Since we are interested in how per capita productivity ( ) influences an individual’sg/n
competitive effort, we rearrange the numerator of to obtain*z /n
2 * ′ * ′
* ( ) ( ) g/n g[(n  1)r  1]  nz (n{[1  (n  1)r]g  nrc }  1  r g )  n(n  1)(g  ng z )rz z zi,n i iz
1 0, if 1 .
2n n (1  r)(n  1)n
(A3)
Inequality (A3) simplifies, if one considers interactions among unrelated individuals (i.e., where the evolutionarily
stable level of competitive effort is expected to be highest), to become
* *z (g/n) g(n  2)  n(g  ng )zz z , ni i1 0, if 1 . (A4)
n n n(n  1)
These inequalities suggest that faster increases (or slower decreases) of per capita productivity with group size tend to
promote a concomitant increase in social conflict. This occurs because condition (A2) becomes easier to satisfy. However,
when the denominator in (A2) becomes positive, the inequality in condition (A4) will be reversed, meaning that faster
increases in per capita productivity will promote a slower increase (or decrease) in social conflict. Moreover, if the
marginal decrease in group productivity with competitive effort is a sufficiently fast decreasing function of others’
competitive efforts (i.e., a high enough cross derivative ), then inequality (A4) can be reversed. This might happengz zi, j
when small total competitive efforts decrease group productivity so much that later competition cannot decrease it
further (i.e., if group productivity requires a very low level of discord). In such a case, many of the relations considered
here would also be reversed. Because there is little data available on how individuals’ competitive interactions interact
with each other in reducing group productivity, more empirical effort on this issue is needed.
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